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Using data from voluntary Swedish sick insurance societies 1902-
1910, this paper analyzes the coexistence of pure and mutual insur-
ance societies where pure societies are characterized by charging ex
ante premiums only while mutuals in addition charge ex post as-
sessments. Mutual insurance societies are found, on average, to be
larger and to oer longer insurance coverage duration. Pure insur-
ance societies have, on average, higher insurance coverage per day,
greater mean levels of moral hazard controls, a higher mean number
of policy categories and are on average, older.
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This study uses a unique historic data to analyze the coexistence of pure
and mutual insurance societies. Although there is a fairly extensive liter-
ature on the theoretical dierences between these insurance types as well
as the nature of their coexistence,1 the empirical work is scant. Pure and
mutual insurance dier in their choice of nancing system. Pure insurance
societies use ex ante premiums only while mutual insurance societies in
addition to ex ante premiums, also excise assessments ex post. Mutual in-
surance is therefore a form of risk sharing between members. This type of
insurance is expected to cater to smaller groups of homogenous, in terms
of risk, members, motivated to control moral hazard problems. The xed
contracts oered by pure insurance societies cater in turn, to a more het-
erogenous, potentially higher risk clientele who without specic controls,
lack the motivation to minimize moral hazard problems. A parallel study
(Nekby et al., 2000), based on the same data, indicate that economies
of scale in insurance provision dier between these insurance types where
mutual insurance societies exhibit returns to scale whereas pure insurance
societies do not. It is argued that this is due to a sorting eect. This
paper, using insurance society data, will empirically study whether theo-
retical predictions concerning size, premiums, benets and moral hazard
control, rendering from choice of nancing system, are upheld and whether
these dierences support the hypothesis of a sorting eect.
The data, covering all Swedish sick insurance societies from 1892-1910,
was compiled as a result of the 1891 Law of Registered Sick Insurance Soci-
eties oering an administration subsidy to all sick insurance societies who
freely registered with the government. As such detailed information con-
cerning both nancial and policy variables of insurance societies became
available. The pre-1910 insurance market was otherwise largely unregu-
lated and insurance societies were free to set policies concerning type of
nancial system. This rich data set therefore provides a unique opportu-
nity to examine empirically theory concerning pure and mutual insurance.
In order to do so, this study uses the society data to generate indicators for
1See Born et al. (1995), Marshall (1974), Skogh (1999), Smith & Stultzer(1995), van
der Linden (1996), Wu (2000).
1variables of interest and analyzes dierences across insurance types. To test
the robustness of these results when controlling for society size and dier-
ences in registered sick levels (among others), a logit analysis is performed.
Finally, in order to check that systematic dierences between societies with
longer/shorter registration periods do not inuence the results, an analysis
is run on a balanced sub-panel of insurance societies.
The main results are that mutual insurance societies are not constrained
to smaller membership sizes. Mutuals appear to oer longer insurance
coverage duration while pure insurance societies provided greater coverage
per day. A variable incorporating both dimensions, i.e., level and duration,
indicates that on average mutuals insurance societies are associated with
more generous insurance policies. Consistent with theoretical predictions,
pure insurance societies are found to have more stringent moral hazard
controls, a greater mean number of policy categories and are, on average,
older.
This paper continues with a brief section describing the historical back-
ground to this panel data set followed by a section discussing the theoreti-
cal work concerning pure versus mutual insurance. Section 4 describes the
data and the empirical set up. Sections 5-7 systematically analyze the vari-
ables of interest; membership size, insurance benets and premiums and
moral hazard controls. Section 8 discusses other dierences between pure
and mutual insurance. Section 9 presents the logit analysis estimating the
probability of being one or the other insurance type and the eect various
variables have on this likelihood. This is followed by a section discussing
selection issues. The paper is concluded in section11.
2 Historical Background
The rst sick insurance societies were established in Sweden in the early
1700's within various trade guilds. It is not however until 1870-1885, that
a surge in establishment is noted associated with this period's rapid indus-
trialization and urbanization. A parliamentary committee set up in 18842
to study the emerging insurance market observed that the sick coverage
2Arbetaref ors akringskommitt en
2oered by the existing insurance societies was small3 and uncertain in the
sense that insurance societies frequently dissolved leaving members without
insurance. In order to stimulate the development of sick insurance societies,
the 1891 Law of Registered Sick Insurance Societies implemented an ad-
ministrative subsidy for those societies who voluntarily registered with the
government.4 Registration implied sending annual nancial statements as
well as information concerning policy statutes to the Department of Public
Administration and after 1901, to the National Board of Trade. Although
successful in stimulating the development of especially small insurance so-
cieties, it was apparent that the emerging market had problems both in
terms of reaching a greater proportion of the population5 and in terms
of providing safe insurance options. Fierce competition led to nancially
unsound policies and due to the high rate of closures, uncertain health cov-
erage.6 The subsequent 1910 Law of Registered Sick Insurance Societies
increased regulation while maintaining the voluntary nature of the Swedish
sick insurance system. Among other regulations, ex post assessments were
forbidden except for temporary budget decits. The 1910 law therefore ef-
fectively marks the demise of Swedish mutual insurance societies as dened
here.7
3The average amount of sick insurance coverage per week was 7:24 SEK for male
members and 5:70 SEK for female members in current prices (Tegendal (1949)). For
comparison, note that the average annual income for a manual worker who recieved
board via the employer was 172 SEK in current prices in Sweden,1893. Our data shows
an average sick insurance coverage of 8:80 SEK per member and week, 1902-1910.
4See Table 1 for number of insurance societies and number of members for Stockholm
and  Osterg otland, 1902-1910.
5In 1905, 85 percent of active sick insurance societies were registered covering ap-
proximately 14.1 percent of the adult (15 years and older) population (Edebalk, 1996).
6Berge (1995), Edebalk (1996)
7Historical studies on the Swedish insurance market include Lindeberg (1949),
Lindquist (1990), Berge (1995), Edebalk (1996) and Edebalk et. al. (1998). A spe-
cial issue on the topic was published by the Journal of the Archive and Library of
the Swedish labour movement (1999). Included in this issue are studies by Andersson
(1999), Edebalk (1999), Grip (1999), Johansson (1999a), Johansson (1999b). These con-
tributions are in Swedish, however, Simonson (1996) has an English overview published
in van der Linden (1996).
33 Theoretical Background
The coexistence of pure and mutual sick insurance societies which charac-
terizes the pre-1910 Swedish insurance market renders the question as to
how these two insurance forms dier. Do they cater to dierent segments
of the market? Is the market large enough or varied enough for the two
forms to coexist? Do they oer dierent insurance options and at dierent
costs? The theoretical work points to a number of dierences which this
section summarizes in brief.
Mutual insurance is a pooling of risk between members. Mutuals can
be dened broadly. van der Linden (1996) for example, denes mutuals as
\associations formed voluntarily for the purpose of providing their members
with nancial assistance in case of need". This paper, however, focuses on
Skogh's (1999) more stringent denition. Mutual insurance is an agreement
on sharing of losses ex post. As such it diers from the pure insurance option
in which insurees trade risk with an insurer at a premium xed ex ante.
Although mutuals can combine ex ante fees with ex post assessments and
do not necessarily excise assessments every year, pure insurance societies
utilize ex ante fees only.
Mutuals arose as an ecient means of addressing contract challenges
caused by aggregate uncertainties, that hindered pricing and operation, and
moral hazard. These two themes dominate as to why mutuals arise and
thrive alongside pure insurance societies. The original mutuals were based
on implicit or explicit guarantees between members to support each other
in the event of an accident or illness. Based on mutual trust, this type of
agreement was found among groups that had long term relationships with
one another such as within families, syndicates, unions and professional
groups. As such mutual sharing of loss is expected among groups with
similar risks, common knowledge of possible moral hazard and repeated
exchange, reputation or some other form of social control.8
Risk sharing in the mutual insurance framework is based on the pre-
sumption that all in the pool face the same risks.9 Agents assume that
they are faced with the same potential losses and the same underlying
8Skogh (1999)
9Skogh (1999)
4probabilities of loss. The actual probabilities are not known ex ante but as
information about risk develops, mutuals may have to adjust their policies.
In addition the mutual insurance form often developed to serve a clientele
committed to risk reduction and the control of moral hazard. One way
of inducing appropriate behavior to minimize risk probabilities is to have
insurees bear part of the prot risk associated with aggregate variability.
The participating contract, i.e., contracts that allow taxation of assessments
ex post, of the mutual insurance form serves this function.10
As mutual societies grow in number, trust between members may di-
minish leading to the need for premiums ex ante in addition to the char-
acteristic assessments ex post. Wu (2000) shows that as information about
risk becomes available, mutuals develop similar contract solutions for dif-
ferent risk groups and for asymmetric information as pure insurance so-
cieties. This despite the assumption that mutuals have an institutional
form used to control adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Low
risk insurees signal their type by purchasing participating contracts from
mutual cooperatives, while high risk insurees prefer insurance contracts
with xed premiums. Although members in the same mutual are assumed
to have similar risks and presumably know the insured risk better than
insurers, growth may necessitate policies dealing with issues of asymmetric
information.
One of few previous empirical studies on the coexistence of pure and
mutual insurance societies, Born et al. (1995) nd that historically, the
mutual insurance form was able to oer lower fees than pure insurance
societies.11 Several reasons for this are stipulated. Mutuals ameliorated
monitoring problems. Mutuals screened prospective members in an eort
to insure only the better risks. Mutuals oered services such as loss preven-
tion recommendations. Members were seen as participants in a long-term
relationship. Finally the common interest of mutual members in reducing
insurance costs may have reduced moral hazard problems.12 Born et al.
also nd that relative to mutuals, pure insurance societies are more likely
10Smith and Stutzer (1995)
11Born et al. (1995) analyse the coexistence of mutual and stock (dened here as
pure) insurance companies in the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry.
12A contrary view is provided by Marshall (1974) who postulates that most mutuals
avoid using assessments by charging suciently high initial premiums.
5to reduce their business in unprotable situations. For a given amount
of premiums, pure insurance companies have larger losses than mutuals.
Their results are consistent with the theoretical arguments that mutuals
are more careful in screening and better able to attract lower risk insurees
than the pure insurance societies.
4 Data Description and Empirical Set-up
The data, compiled rst by the Department of Public Administration
(Civildepartementet) and after 1900, by the National Board of Trade (Kung-
liga Kommerskollegiet), contains annual information from all registered
Swedish sick insurance societies from 1892-1910. The society data consists
of two sets: nancial accounts and policy statutes. The nancial accounts
contain detailed information on income and expenses, number of members,
sick cases and sick days, all by gender, as well as information regarding
assets and debts. The policy statutes yield information concerning op-
tional/mandatory membership, number of policy categories, age and sex
restrictions for membership, premium and assessment levels, regulations
regarding eligibility for sick and funeral coverage, as well as benet lev-
els13.
The data used in this paper come from two regions, Stockholm City
and  Osterg otland County. These regions were chosen in order to include
both a larger metropolitan area and a more rural area.14 The data from
1892-1901 are dropped due to poor registration compliance. Left is a data
set that consists of annual information from a total of 493 registered soci-
eties (3,849 observations) divided between 222 mutual insurance societies
(1,770 observations) and 271 pure insurance societies (2,079 observations).
The insurance societies are coded as pure insurance societies if they register
income from initial fees and annual premiums only and as mutuals if they
in addition, register income from assessments during any of the nine years
under observation. The policy data give information on assessment levels
due to illness among all members, i.e., the amount taxed for sick insurance
13See Appendix for full variable list.
14Selection of only two regions is also motivated by the large amount of data in
published tables that must be transferred into machine-readable format.
6per week and member. However only thirteen societies stipulate assess-
ment levels in the statutes (103 observations), presumably the majority of
mutuals maintained the freedom to charge varying assessment levels. For
this reason the denition of pure contra mutual insurance focuses on the
societies' revenue statistics and not on the policy variables.
The theoretical dierences between pure and mutual insurance societies
are to a large degree based on how insurance societies' choice of nancing
system inuences membership, both in terms of risk types and in terms of
behavior. As such, one would optimally like to study individual insurees'
choice of insurance society and the personal characteristics of these mem-
bers. Lack of individual data prevents this. The available society data
however can give an indication of membership characteristics. The data
are grouped into several categories indicating benet levels and duration,
costs to members of insurance coverage, moral hazard control policies, orga-
nizational form and nancial status. Potential dierences across insurance
types are analyzed.15
Based on sample means and means tests, sections 6-8 analyze the data
focusing on the dierences between pure and mutual insurance societies
and where relevant, relating the results to theoretical predictions.16 A
thorough analysis of the data is motivated by the lack of previous empirical
work in general and of this data set in particular. A sensitivity analysis is
completed for all variables checking to what degree outliers inuence the
results, but reported only when results are aected. To further check the
robustness of the results when controlling for various measures of registered
sick levels, society size, and nancial status (among others) a logit analysis
is completed on the full sample. Note that this is a so called unbalanced
panel in that there is entry and exit of societies during the nine year period
under observation and that there are competing unregistered insurance
societies at the time for which there is no available data. As such, the
potential biases stemming from these selection issues are discussed and
analyzed in a separate section. The idea is to use all available dimensions
15Although a majority of the sick insurance societies oered funeral insurance as well,
focus is on sick insurance as moral hazard problems do not arise with funeral insurance.
16Tables 2 and 3 show the sample means of the variables derived from, respectively,
the nancial accounts and the policy statutes.
7of the data in order to fully check the stability of the reported results.
5 Membership size
The mean for membership size, shown in Table 2, indicates that mutual in-
surance societies tend to be larger than pure insurance societies, although
the variation in size is also much greater.17 Excluding these larger soci-
eties from the statistics reduces the mean membership size,18 but mutuals
remain, on average, larger than their pure insurance counterparts.
Although Stockholm societies, are larger than those from  Osterg otland,
the above pattern across insurance types is upheld within each region.19
Membership size may be correlated to organizational form. Table 4 shows
that the open and national organizations had the largest mean member-
ships across both insurance types. Mutuals are to a larger degree composed
of these two organizational forms.20
As the mutual insurance form is based on a pooling of risk among
homogenous risk groups and presupposes social control over and trust in
co-members, one would have expected smaller membership in this type
of insurance society. In addition, it is surmised that upholding member
similarity during expansion may be dicult.
17Of the population of mutuals, 5 percent are larger than 1,031 members during
the period 1902-1910. This corresponds to twelve mutual insurance societies who are
outliers in terms of size during some or all of the observed years. One of these societies,
F oreningen Enighet Ger Styrka (Unity Gives Strength), had an annual membership level
exceeding 13,000 members and recorded the largest membership overall, 15,838 members
in 1909. Only two societies had membership levels exceeding 5000 members, the above
and F oreningen V anfast (Constant in Friendship) sbk, both Stockholm societies.
18Removal of outliers for mutual insurance societies reduces the mean to 214.5 mem-
bers (st. dev.: 197.2)
19Mean members (st. dev. in parenthesis)









20The two main outliers in terms of membership size, F oreningen Enighet Ger Styrka
and F oreningen V anfast (sbk), were both open mutual insurance societies.
86 Insurance benets and premiums
This section will look at dierences in sick insurance provision and the
premiums/assessments charged to members for this coverage. Insurance
benets are comprised of two dimensions, level and duration. Lack of
individual data prevents analysis of individual insurance solutions however
the society data provides indicators of insurance provision.
A look at Table 3, the sample means for policy variables, shows that
mutuals did not stipulate, on average, signicantly higher sick insurance
coverage per week nor did they specify longer insurance coverage duration.
Using the nancial data on each societies expenses for sick insurance bene-
ts, three indicators for insurance coverage were generated; sick insurance
per registered member, per registered sick case and per registered sick day.
Two of these show that mutuals had, relative to pure insurance societies,
signicantly greater mean expenses for sick benets.21 The policy variables
therefore do not indicate signicantly higher or longer sick insurance cover-
age for mutual societies although actual expenses for sick coverage appears
to dier across insurance types.22
Turning to the insurance costs to members, i.e., the premiums and
assessments paid for insurance coverage, both the policy and nancial data
provide relevant indicators. The policy data contain information on initial
membership fees as well as annual premiums. Assessment levels are also
given for both sick coverage and funeral coverage. The latter are posted
ex ante, i.e., indicate the amount each member is taxed for illness or death
among all members.23 The total costs of insurance to members within
mutuals is therefore dicult to appreciate as members may have incomplete
knowledge of illness probabilities within any given mutual society. The
21Mean sick coverage per sick case is signicantly larger for mutual insurance societies
compared to pure insurance societies at the 10% level.
22One can mention that medical coverage, i.e., reimbursements for physician care or
medicine, is on average larger, within the pure insurance form. This form of coverage
was not however, used extensively among Swedish sick insurance societies (Lindeberg,
1949). In our data, 75 percent of societies had zero expenses for medical outlays both
in terms of medical coverage per sick day and medical coverage per registered sick case.
This is true of both pure and mutual insurance societies.
23A majority, 95 percent, of mutual sick insurance sociteties do not however specify
assessment levels in the policy data.
9sample means for these policy variables indicate that there are ex ante
dierences in initial fees and annual premiums. The mutual insurance type
has signicantly lower mean initial fees but higher mean annual premiums
than the pure insurance type. In addition, members of mutuals have a
positive probability of being charged an assessment ex post. As such it
appears that mutual sick insurance is, on average, annually more expensive
to members.
The nancial data, in turn, provides information on registered annual
revenue per society, stemming from initial fees, annual premiums and as-
sessments. These variables indicate that mutuals had signicantly greater
revenue per member stemming from membership fees than pure insurance
societies. The mean for average premium paid is signicantly larger at
the ten percent level and this variable does not take into consideration the
added expense to members of assessments. Taking into account average as-
sessments paid, the mutual insurance form is, without a doubt, on average
more expensive to members than the pure insurance form. In short, the
mutual insurance type appears to spend more per member on insurance
provision but at a greater expense, on average, to members.24
Higher insurance costs to members together with larger insurance bene-
ts may then reect a sorting of dierent risk types into dierent insurance
options. Higher fees can act as a screening device to attract a higher in-
come clientele.25 A further indicator of insurance coverage is the amount,
per society, spent on insurance benets relative revenue from premiums
and assessments, which provides a rough measure of the amount of in-
surance coverage members are getting, on average, for their money. The
mean for the variable, sick coverage per annual total fees, shows no signi-
cant dierences across insurance types. Taking account of only premiums,
i.e. no assessments, yields results indicating that pure insurance societies
have greater expenses for insurance benets relative income from premi-
ums. This underscores the importance of evaluating, ex ante, probable
assessment levels. There is, in addition, large variation among mutuals in
24Two out of three indicators for registered illness levels show that mutual members
register signicantly higher mean levels. This may be a result of more generous insurance
policies or alternatively may be the reason for greater expenses on insurance provision
within mutuals.
25Income and health are also likely to be correlated in the pre-1910 period.
10assessment levels.26 With some degree of risk aversion, all else equal, the
pure insurance form will be preferred. Risk aversion is also likely to be
correlated to income where low income groups will prefer the known con-
tracts of the pure insurance societies rather than risk potentially nancially
dicult assessments. In summary, there are no dierences across insurance
types, on average, in the amount spent by insurance societies in insurance
provision per total fees paid for this insurance by members.
This section has shown that according to policy, there are no dier-
ences across insurance types in mean sick coverage. The nancial data
however show that mutuals had greater expenses on average for sick cov-
erage. Both the nancial and policy data show that mutuals set higher
annual premiums. Including assessments, mutual sick insurance was, on
average, annually more expensive to members.
7 Moral hazard controls
As the mutual insurance form presupposes membership homogeneity in
terms of risk proles and has a built in institutional form, the partici-
pating contract, to minimize moral hazard, one would expect the pure
insurance form to more frequently use controls for moral hazard as well
as to set higher levels. The sample means indicate that the data, in part,
support this supposition. There are three registered stipulations for bene-
t eligibility in the policy data.27 Insurance societies may of course have
availed themselves of other controls not subject to registration. The rst
of these controls concerns waiting time after entry for sick insurance eli-
gibility. In addition, the societies could use a qualifying time after onset
of illness for sick insurance coverage,28 for example sick insurance may be
paid only from the third registered sick day. Finally, minimum sick days
stipulates the minimum duration of an illness for which sick coverage is
26Society revenue from assessments has a range from 0 to 29,540 SEK with a mean
of 234 SEK (st. dev.: 1,480 SEK). Average assessments (assessments/member) has a
range from 0.002 to 105.82 SEK/member with a mean of 2.49 SEK/member (st. dev.:
5.16).
27Gurantee fees are also registered but used only by the mutual insurance form.
28Swedish: karenstid
11paid.29 The data indicate that the pure insurance form had signicantly
longer mean waiting times for sick insurance coverage eligibility, as well as
a longer mean qualifying time after onset of illness.30 There is no signi-
cant dierence between the insurance types regarding mean minimum sick
days. The percentage of each type of society using the available controls
does not dier dramatically.31
In summary, two of the three indicators for moral hazard control avail-
able in the data show that the pure insurance form had signicantly larger
mean levels than the mutual insurance form. This support theoretical pre-
dictions that mutuals have built in controls for moral hazard behavior via
the participating contract and social control over members.
8 Other characteristics
The two insurance types are evenly distributed in Stockholm, while pure in-
surance is relatively more prevalent in  Osterg otland.32 Stockholm societies
tend to be larger and more expensive, both in terms of costs to members
in the form of premiums and assessments and in terms of society costs in
29In the data it is common that insurance societies avail themselves of one or the other
of the latter two controls. When both are used, the stipulations tend to follow each other.
For example the qualifying time may be six days and the minimum duration seven days.
In other words, no insurance coverage is paid for the rst six days of a registered illness
and seven days must be registered for any insurance to be paid out, thereby giving the
sick member in this example, one day of insurance coverage for one week out of work
due to illness.
30Note that the variable mean qualifying time after onset of illness shows a large vari-
ation among pure insurance societies. The range for mutual insurance societies using
this form of moral hazard control is from 1 to 15 days. For pure insurance societies the
range is from 1 to 100 days. However, only ve percent of pure insurance observations
exceed 8 days. Three pure insurance societies have signicantly larger values for qualify-
ing time, Seperators arbetares shk. (sbk.) (Seperator's Worker's Sick Insurance Society)
with an annual value of 70 days, Stockholms forts attningskassa (Stockholm's Insurance
Continuation Society) with 90 days and  Aterf ors akringsf oreningen "Gemensamhet" i
 Atvidaberg (Re-insurance Society `Togetherness' in  Atvidaberg) with 100 days. The
latter two appear to be `re-insurance' societies which provide insurance rst after the
initial insurance benets are depleted for members with long-term illnesses. It would
then be in line with this type of insurance to set longer qualifying times for sick insurance
coverage.
31The percentage of societies indicating non-zero levels of the following moral hazard
control variables, by type of insurance society:
waiting time-illness: mutuals 58.3%, pure insurance 54.8%; qualifying time: mutuals
11.0%, pure insurance 13.7%; min. sick days: mutuals 88.5%, pure insurance 90.8%.
3258.5 percent of  Osterg otland societies were pure insurance societies.
12the form of expenses for sick coverage.
In terms of organizational form, Table 4 shows the distribution within
each society type.33 Pure insurance societies were, relative to mutual in-
surance societies, more prevalent in the skills- and employer-based orga-
nizational forms while mutuals were relatively more common among open,
special interest, and national organizations. The latter two are organiza-
tions which are characterized by having other primary objectives than the
provision of sick insurance to members. As such, members of any given
special interest organization or trade union may have been fairly homoge-
nous in character. Open organizations are only open in the sense that
they are not exclusively for members of a certain occupation or place of
employment, as such other selection criteria were employed explaining the
prevalence of this organizational form among mutual insurance societies.
Several variables indicating nancial status are available, average bal-
ance, average assets and average debt. Pure insurance societies yield sig-
nicantly higher mean levels for all three. The debt/asset ratio gives an
indication of nancial viability. Mutual insurance societies appear to have
a lower mean debt/asset ratio of 1.3 percent compared to the mean for
pure insurance societies of 11 percent. However this result is inuenced
by outliers in the debt variable.34 Eliminating outliers, the mean for pure
insurance societies is lower than for mutual insurance societies. The compa-
rable debt/asset ratio is therefore also lower. Removal of outliers indicates
that contrary to the initial picture, pure insurance societies have a lower
debt/asset ratio than mutuals.
In terms of stipulated gender requirements 19 percent of pure insurance
33Skills-based societies are those originally associated with trade guilds Employer-
based societies are those whose name reect a place of employment. This category is
primarily composed of factory and mining establishments. Open societies include a wide
array of sick insurance forms, among them; worker associations, hundred-men organiza-
tions, local, i.e., geographically based sick insurance societies, fraternity organizations
and women's associations. The special interest organizational form is composed of a
number of interest organizations that do not have sick insurance as their primary objec-
tive, among these are non-conformist religious organizations, temperance organizations
and local trade unions. The national organizations consist of both national sick insur-
ance societies and national trade unions oering sick insurance as part of membership
benets.
34One pure insurance society in particular, Allm anna sbk. i Stockholm, had average
debt levels exceeding 500 SEK/member across all observed years. Other pure insurance
societies ranged from 3-16 SEK/member at the upper end of the distribution.
13societies restricted membership to males only and 5 percent to females only.
The comparable numbers for mutual insurance societies are 22 percent
and 4 percent respectively. The remaining societies were characterized by
mixed membership policies. Note that these gures are based on policy
restrictions, the actual percentage of female members can be seen in the
variable ratio of female members reported in Table 2. Mutual insurance
societies had, on average, a signicantly higher ratio of female members
than pure insurance societies. There are also dierences in the age of the
societies.35 Pure insurance societies are, on average, signicantly older
than mutual insurance societies.36 Finally, the number of policy options
oered diers between insurance types. Approximately 34 percent of pure
insurance societies oered more than one insurance option compared to 26
percent of mutual insurance societies.37
9 Pure vs. mutual insurance
Using the available nancial and policy variables, a between logit analysis is
performed in order to analyze the dierences in pure and mutual insurance
societies with respect to the given independent variables. Between estima-
tion implies that the logit estimation is based on the mean values of the
explanatory variables, per society over time. This because the dependent
variable, type of nancing system, is constant over time by denition.38
Several model specications are estimated with dierent combinations of
35Year of establishment is available in the nancial data. Mean values for society age:
Mutuals: 18.9 years (st. dev. 15.6). Pure insurance: 22.6 years (st. dev. 24.0).
36There are two outliers, Snickare-och instrumentmakares allskapet (The Association
for Carpenters and Instrument Makers), which is the oldest registered society at 240
years in 1910 and Skr adderiarbetarnes sbk.(The Society for Tailor Employees), which
was 191 years old in 1910. Both these societies are skills-based organizations stemming
from older trade guilds.
37Over 90 percent of both insurance types, however, oer a maximum of two policy
options.
38There are mutual societies who varied in their use of assessments from year to
year, pooled estimation is therefore possible but not consistent with the denition of
type of nancing system used here. If one dened type of nancing system by year,
random eects logit estimation would be possible although a check of the quadrature
approximation method used in random eects estimation indicates that the results are
sensitive to quadrature points and that this estimation procedure should be avoided.
Dening type of nancing system by year also allows for conditional logit estimation,
i.e. within logit estimation but would only capture variation within mutual insurance
societies.
14the variables in order to ascertain the robustness of the coecients as well
as to avoid multicollinearity problems. As there are several available in-
dicators for, respectively, benet levels, sick levels and premiums, which
are highly and signicantly correlated, a principal component analysis is
also performed. The analysis based on cross-tabulations and the theory
concerning pure contra mutual insurance societies leads us to expect cer-
tain relationships, it is therefore interesting to see if these correlations are
upheld when controlling for other society characteristics as well as to de-
termine how the available variables aect the likelihood of being one or the
other insurance type.
Results, reported in Table 5, report four model specications.39 Begin-
ning with mutual insurance societies, higher mean levels of the following
explanatory variables increases the likelihood of the insurance society being
a mutual; members, average sick days and average sick cases. The dummy
variable for special interest organizations is also associated with mutual
insurance societies regardless of comparison group. Turning to pure insur-
ance societies, higher mean levels of the following variables increases the
likelihood of the society being a pure insurance society; initial fees, insur-
ance coverage per total fees40, average assets, average debts, society age,
number of policy categories and employer- and skills-based organizations.
Indicators for insurance coverage to members vary in sign. The variable
mean sick coverage per member yields negative coecients while the vari-
able mean sick coverage per sick day yields positive coecients which is
also true of the variable mean sick coverage per sick case, where signicant.
Including indicators for member's registered illness levels therefore alters
the results based on cross tabulations. The variable average sick days,
i.e., registered sick days per member, can be seen as a proxy for insurance
coverage duration and yields a negative coecient in the logit estimation.
These results therefore suggest that higher coverage per day is associated
with pure insurance solutions whereas longer insurance coverage duration
is associated with mutual insurance societies. Note that the variable sick
39Note that the availability of indicators allows for a multitude of model specications,
as such the following discussion is based on results that are robust across both reported
and non-reported estimations.
40This variable includes all society revenue stemming from insurance payments from
members, i.e., includes assessments ex post
15coverage per member takes into account both dimensions of insurance cov-
erage implying that more generous sick insurance benets are associated
with mutual insurance societies.
Turning to premiums and assessments, higher initial fees are associated
with pure insurance societies whereas the coecients for annual premiums
vary in sign. One can not therefore state with certainty that mutuals
charge on average higher annual premiums. The variable measuring society
expenses per revenue for sick insurance coverage to members, i.e. sick
coverage per total fees, yields a positive signicant coecient in all model
specications. In means tests, this variable did not signicantly dier
between pure and mutual societies. The positive coecient here can be
interpreted as an indicator that members of pure insurance societies are
getting more sick insurance for their money or, as the variable is based
on society nancial data, as a signal of precarious policies on the part of
pure insurance societies. Pure insurance societies, on average, are spending
more on insurance benets relative their revenue from premiums.
That older societies are associated with pure insurance societies sup-
ports the prediction that this type of society develops as actuarial informa-
tion improves over time. That a higher mean number of policy categories
increases the likelihood of the society being pure is also consistent with
theoretical observations that pure insurance societies attract a more het-
erogenous, in terms of risk, clientele and need to dierentiate among these
risk groups. A higher mean number of policy categories is also dependent
on the development of actuarial information which occurs over time and
is therefore consistent with the observation that pure insurance societies
are on average older. Finally, larger mean levels of the moral hazard con-
trol variables, mean waiting time and mean qualifying time, increases the
likelihood of the society being pure, a result which supports the predic-
tion that pure societies must more actively meet moral hazard problems.
Finally, consistent with the analysis based on cross-tabulations, skill- and
employer-based organizations are associated with pure insurance societies
and special interest organizations with the mutual insurance form.41
41Multicollinearity is a potential problem. In order to minimize this problem a princi-
pal component analysis is used to group together the variables that are collinear into a
composite index capable of representing the group by itself. This is done for the follow-
1610 Selection Issues
There are in total 493 registered insurance societies in  Osterg otland and
Stockholm between 1902-1910, 325 of these existed during the entire obser-
vation period. The remaining either entered or exited (or both) the data
at some point between 1902 and 1910. There are two sources of selection
bias of concern. The rst occurs due to so-called initial non-response, that
is to say, certain sick insurance societies chose not to register at all. As
data is unavailable for these unregistered health insurance societies, one
can only speculate as to how these societies diered and for what reasons
they chose not to register. One possibility may be that unregistered soci-
eties deemed the costs associated with registration to outweigh the benets.
Alternatively, small membership size, lack of administrative routines or ad-
ministrative sta and/or short longevity may have precluded registration.
Finally, registration implied the possibility of public scrutiny of each insur-
ance societies' nancial status, being unregistered may therefore have been
a signal of poor nancial stability.42
As the data available is a so-called unbalanced panel, the second source
of concern focuses on the possible dierences between those societies that
existed the entire observation period and those that entered/exited the
panel from 1902-1910. A balanced sub-panel is created consisting of 2,925
observations over insurance societies that had annual observations regis-
tered from 1902-1910. Attrition from the unbalanced panel to the bal-
anced sub-panel may be a product of entering/exiting insurance societies
choosing to begin/end registration during the observation period. Alterna-
tively registered insurance societies may have established later than 1902,
dissolved before 1910 or both.43 Selection from the unbalanced to the bal-
ing groups where correlations among the variables were above 0.50%: registered illness
levels, sick insurance coverage, annual premiums (excluding initial fees), and the nan-
cial variables average assets and average debts. The principal component for registered
illness levels is negative and signicant in most specications. The principal component
for sick coverage is positive and signicant in all specications. The principal com-
ponent for annual premiums yield a negative and signicant coecient in all models.
Finally the principal component for the nancial variables average asset and average
debt yields a positive signicant coecient in all model specications. The principal
component analysis therefore conrms the logit results reported above.
42Berge (1995) notes that unregistered insurance societies competed for members with
low fees but were often unable to meet their obligations when illnesses occurred.
43Of the 168 insurance societies in the data that had less than nine observations, 139
17anced sub-panel may be non-random yielding biased estimation results.44
The data are separated into three main categories where survivors are
those insurance societies that have nine observations, i.e. existed during
the entire observation period, entry societies denotes the group of societies
that began registration after 1902 and exit societies are those societies that
cease registration before 1910. Table 6 indicates that the pure insurance
societies are relatively more prevalent than mutuals among survivors and
entry societies. Exit from registration appears to be evenly spread be-
tween the two insurance types.45 Table 6 also makes clear that there is
more volatility in Stockholm, 60 percent of entry occurs among Stockholm
insurance societies and 67 percent of exits.
Table 7 indicates that in comparison to the distribution over survivors,
both entry and exit is more prevalent among the skills- and employer-
based organizations and less prevalent among open organizations. As the
period under observation is characterized by rapid industrial growth, the
over-representation of these two types of organizations may be due to the
dynamics of the industrial sector, i.e. rapid creation and destruction of
rms. The special interest and national organizations are less likely to
exit the data, again compared to survivors distribution. This may be
a consequence of these two types of organizations having other primary
objectives than the provision of sick insurance.
A look at the sample means shown in Tables 8 and 9, shows that there
are some interesting dierences between survivors and entry societies as
well as survivors and exit societies. Entry societies have a smaller mean
membership than survivors which may be a consequence of them being,
on average, younger46 or relatively more heavily concentrated in the skills-
entered at some point after 1902, 39 exited before 1910 and ten societies both entered
and exited between 1902 and 1910. Some insurance societies may have merged with
others, a process not controlled for other than that they cease to be registered under
the old name, i.e. exit from the data.
44Duration analysis is not completed as exit from the data does not imply exit from
the insurance market. As such, results from duration analysis would be dicult to
interpret.
45Information on the category entry and exit is included although this category con-
sists of only 10 insurance societies (33 observations) and is already represented in the
entry and exit statistics.
46Mean society age: survivors 22.79 years (st. dev.: 22.02), entry societies: 14.87
years (st. dev.: 14.77).
18based organizations which are characterized by smaller mean memberships.
The sample statistics also indicate that entry societies have a larger mean
annual income, per member, from premiums and assessments as well as
stating higher, on average, annual premiums in their policy statutes. They
therefore appear to oer more expensive insurance coverage to members.
Although indicators for insurance coverage show higher mean levels both
in terms of actual society expenses for sick coverage to members and in
terms of policy variables such as mean coverage per week, the variable
sick coverage per paid total fees (including assessments) are signicantly
lower for entry societies than for survivors. Entry societies therefore have
lower expenses for sick insurance coverage per income from premiums and
assessments.
Turning to the dierences between exit societies and survivors, the sam-
ple means show that mean membership is signicantly and considerably
smaller. This can in part be due to the distribution of these societies
among organizations with smaller mean membership, but is also likely to
be an indicator of the problems for insurance societies associated with small
membership size. The indicators for society expenses due to sick coverage,
available in the nancial data, show that exit societies had higher mean
levels than survivors despite stipulating lower mean levels in the policy
data.
Logit estimation on the unbalanced panel including the selection terms
ni; the number of years health insurance society i is observed and survivor,
a 0 - 1 variable equal to one if insurance society i is observed all nine
periods, yield that frequency of observations, ni, has a negative signicant
coecient while survivor is insignicant. The selection terms therefore
indicate that insurance societies with a greater number of observations,
when controlling for other observable factors, are more likely to be mutual
insurance societies.
The logit estimation on the balanced sub-panel yield results47 that do
not greatly dier from the unbalanced panel results.48 The main results
47See balanced sub-panel logit estimation results, Table 10.
48Dierences include that mean coverage per week yields a negative signicant coe-
cient in model one. The principal component for this group of inter-correlated variables
indicating sick insurance coverage levels, however remains positive across all model
specications. The moral hazard control variable minimum sick days is signicantly as-
19from the unbalanced panel estimation are upheld indicating that selection
bias between the balanced and unbalanced panel is not an issue in terms
of determining how dierent variables inuence the probability of being
one or the other type of insurance society. This implies that although
the balanced sub-panel is composed of a selection of insurance societies
observed during the entire 1902-1910 period and therefore characterized
by greater stability and presumably sounder nancial strength, this does
not aect the likelihood of being a pure contra mutual insurance society.
11 Conclusion
This paper, based on data from voluntary Swedish sick insurance soci-
eties 1902-1910, has systematically analyzed the dierences between pure
and mutual insurance societies and estimated how dierent variables aect
the probability of being one or the other insurance type. The results re-
ported are obtained from a short panel over a relatively turbulent period of
Swedish sick insurance history and as such should be viewed as preliminary.
This study does however provide an indication as to whether theoretical
predictions concerning pure contra mutual insurance are empirically sup-
ported.
Mutual insurance societies were found, on average, to be signicantly
larger than pure insurance societies, despite theoretical predictions to the
contrary. In terms of insurance benets the data indicate that pure in-
surance societies are associated with greater coverage levels while mutual
insurance societies with longer coverage duration. A variable incorporating
both dimensions shows that mutual insurance societies oer more generous
insurance packages. In terms of the cost of this insurance to members, the
analysis unequivocally shows that pure insurance societies charged higher
mean initial fees. The results for annual premiums are however not robust
and nothing conclusive can be said about annual costs to members for sick
insurance.
Pure insurance societies are associated with greater levels of moral haz-
ard controls, supporting the theoretical prediction that mutuals have built
sociated with pure insurance societies reinforcing the result that higher levels of moral
hazard controls increases the likelihood of the society being pure.
20in controls for moral hazard behavior. Pure insurance societies are also, on
average, older, a result consistent with theoretical notions that this type
of society develops over time as actuarial information improves. Finally,
a higher mean number of policy categories increases the likelihood of the
society being pure which is also consistent with predictions that pure in-
surance societies attract a more heterogenous clientele.
The results reported here, therefore, do not contradict that there may
be a sorting of dierent risk types into the two types of insurance societies.
Mutual insurance societies are found, on average to oer more generous
insurance coverage to members presumably due to built in controls for
moral hazard behavior and to a selection of better risk types. Pure in-
surance societies on the other hand, attract a more heterogenous clientele
lacking the motivation to minimize moral hazard problems as indicated by
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Table 1: No. of registered sick insurance societies & members,
Stockholm &  Osterg otland, 1902-1910.
Total Mutual Insurance Pure Insurance
Year societies members societies members societies members
1902 354 94 706 165 56 014 189 38 692
1903 382 105 031 181 60 931 201 44 100
1904 410 117 132 191 67 281 219 49 851
1905 424 125 138 197 71 774 227 53 364
1906 441 135 666 204 76 063 237 59 603
1907 455 146 737 210 81 832 245 64 905
1908 459 152 443 211 85 700 248 66 743
1909 464 161 758 213 90 708 251 71 050
1910 454 166 341 204 90 372 250 75 969
24Table 2: Sample means by type of insurance society, mutual
contra pure: Financial Accounts. Standard deviation in parenthesis.*
indicates signicant dierence at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, in
means test.
Mutual Insurance Pure Insurance
Financial Accounts
Male members* 255.6 (740.1) 168.9 (243.2)
Female members* 127.7 (456.9) 84.8 (176.5)
Ratio of female members* 0.31 (0.26) 0.29 (0.25)
Avg. male sick cases* 0.25 (0.16) 0.20 (0.11)
Avg. female sick cases* 0.21 (0.15) 0.20 (0.12)
Avg. male sick days* 6.30 (4.65) 5.18 ( 3.43)
Avg. female sick days* 6.87 (10.85) 5.93 (7.07)
Male sick days/sick case 26.63 (12.34) 26.14 (12.55)
Female sick days/sick case 32.19 (27.79) 31.08 (20.79)
Avg. premium paida) 8.28 (4.12) 8.07 (3.72)
Avg. assessment paid 2.49 (5.16) -
Avg. admin. subsidy** 1.16 (0.40) 1.19 (0.50)
Avg. sick coverage* 7.83 (3.83) 6.61 (3.67)
Sick coverage/sick day 1.30 (0.63) 1.31 (0.74)
Sick coverage/sick caseb) 35.08 (23.93) 34.10 (18.23)
Sick coverage/annual feesc)* 1.55 (3.14) 0:85 (0.38)
Sick coverage/annual tot. feed) 0.85 (0.39) 0.85 (0.38)
Medical exp./sick day* 0.01 (0.06) 0.03 (0.12)
Medical exp./sick case* 0.38 (1.61) 0.63 (2.48)
Avg. administration cost* 1.63 (1.23) 1.35 (1.11)
Avg. variable cost* 9.46 (5.62) 7.91 (6.17)
Avg. balance* 1.88 (3.09) 3.06 (4.63)
Avg. assets* 26.46 (22.94) 43.63 (64.87)
Avg. debt* 0.22 (1.34) 2.83 (45.11)
a)The means test for this variable indicates a signicant dierence at the
10% level. The mutual mean is signicantly larger than the pure insurance
mean at the 5% level.
b)Mean sick coverage per sick case is signigicantly larger for mutual
insurance societies compared topure insurance societies at the 10% level.
c)This variable is generated from the nancial data and is equal to:
(Expenses-sick coverage paid)/(Income-annual fees). Note: assessments ex
post not included.
d)This variable is equal to: (paid sick coverage to members)/(annual
fees+annual assessments).
25Table 3: Sample means by type of insurance society, mutual
contra pure: Policy Statutes. Standard deviation in parenthesis.* in-
dicates signicant dierence at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, in
means test.
Mutual Insurance Pure Insurance
Policy Statutes
Mean min.age** 16.37 (1.41) 16.26 (1.52)
Mean max. age** 48.81 (7.32) 48.16 (9.39)
Mean min. initial fee* 2.17 (2.96) 2.75 (5.25)
Mean max. initial fee* 2.73 (3.35) 3.11 (5.40)
Mean min premium* 8.31 (4.30) 7.88 (3.99)
Mean max premium* 8.60 (4.66) 8.24 (4.47)
Mean assessment (illness) 0.18 (0.26) -
Mean assessment (funeral)a) 0.88 (2.48) 0.47 (0.05)
Mean guaranty feeb) 0.24 (1.79) -
Mean waiting time (illness)* 78.0 (67.3) 95.1 (69.4)
Mean waiting time (funeral)* 60.1 (70.6) 93.1 (147.3)
Mean qualifying time* 0.25 (1.2) 0.75 (5.5)
Mean min. duration 5.4 (2.6) 5.3 (3.7)
Mean full coverage 63.0 (32.5) 63.3 (32.6)
Mean half coverage 5.0 (26.7) 5.5 (19.4)
Mean full coverage per case 32.6 (72.7) 29.4 (67.0)
Mean half coverage per case 57.8 (182.2) 48.6 (181.8)
Mean coverage per week 8.85 (3.78) 8.76 (4.23)
Mean funeral coverage* 115.3 (189.4) 67.39 (60.43)
Mean funeral coverage, wifec)* 5.78 (31.29) 2.94 (11.07)
a)There are seven pure insurance societies who register assessment val-
ues for funeral insurance only in their policy statutes yet no income from
assessments.
b)There are eight mutual insurance societies who charge a guranty fee
(56 observations). The size of this fee ranges from 3-25 SEK.
c)18 mutual insurance societies (158 observations) and 21 pure insurance
societies (178 observations) oered funeral coverage for member's wife.
26Table 4: Organizational Form. Distribution by type of insur-
ance society, mutual contra pure.
Mutual insurance Pure insurance
Members Members
org. form % Mean St. dev. % Mean St. dev.
Skills based 10.5 146.52 125.27 18.0 143.23 129.73
Employer based 10.4 306.35 250.83 12.2 222.93 276.31
Open 57.9 436.59 1459.19 55.3 275.12 364.19
Special Interest 8.5 115.25 104.16 5.1 117.09 66.25
National 7.4 855.75 1055.53 4.1 787.35 858.99
Other 5.3 228.86 286.84 5.3 183.55 124.69
27Table 5: Logit estimation, unbalanced panel. Dependent vari-
able: Pure Insurance Societies. Explanatory variables are mean levels
per society. Standard errors in parenthesis. f/p indicates if explanatory
variables originate from nancial accounts or policy statutes. * indicates
signicance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 10% level.49
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society age f . . . 0:008*
(0:002)
ratio of female members f . . . -0:141
(0:152)










Psuedo R2 - 0.4372 0.1314 0.1029 0.1101
no. of observations - 3835 3843 3835 3763
49Other control variables: sick coverage per annual fees in model 1, organisation and
region dummies in model 4, average administration cost and average variable cost in
model 1 and 3.
28Table 6: Distribution of survivors, entry societies and exit
societies
survivors entry societies exit societies entry & exit
Mutual insurance 45.9 45.4 51.9 27.3
Pure insurance 54.1 54.6 48.1 72.7
Stockholm 52.6 60.1 67.1 100.0
sterg tland 47.4 39.9 32.9 0.0
Table 7: Organizational distribution of survivors, entry soci-
eties and exit societies.
survivors entry societies exit societies entry & exit
Skills based 12.0 22.1 28.2 48.5
Employer based 9.9 17.8 11.1 21.2
Open 60.3 41.8 49.5 21.2
Special Interest 7.1 6.8 1.4 9.1
National 5.2 7.6 3.2 -
Other 5.5 3.9 6.5 -
29Table 8: Sample means, survivors, entry societies & exit soci-
ets: Financial Accounts. Standard deviation in parenthesis.* indicates
signicant dierence at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, in means test,
in comparison to survivors.
survivors entry societies exit societies
Financial Accounts
Male members 226.6 (596.0) 164.7 (279.4)* 99.8 (82.2)*
Female members 115.4 (372.0) 76.07 (201.1)* 41.2 (64.6)*
Ratio of female members 0.31 (0.24) 0.26 (0.30)* 0.27 (0.27)**
Avg. male sick cases 0.23 (0.14) 0.21 (0.13)** 0.23 (0.11)
Avg. female sick cases 0.20 (0.13) 0.20 (0.16) 0.23 (0.13)**
Avg. male sick days 5.78 (4.21) 5.25 (3.56)* 6.02 (3.62)
Avg. female sick days 6.44 (9.80) 5.69 (5.33) 7.76 (6.07)
Male sick days/sick case 26.40 (12.46) 26.12 (12.66) 26.32 (11.04)
Female sick days/sick case 31.28 (23.84) 31.05 (20.44) 37.71 (37.64)*
Avg. premium paid 8.01 (3.87) 8.71 (4.11)* 8.55 (3.49)**
Avg. assessment paid 2.21 (3.20) 3.39 (9.89)* 2.82 (2.87)
Avg. admin. subsidy 1.18 (0.44) 1.10 (0.54)* 1.28 (0.32)*
Avg. sick coverage 7.04 (3.60) 7.44 (4.49)* 8.00 (3.52)*
Sick coverage/sick day 1.26 (0.61) 1.46 (0.95)* 1.38 (0.49)*
Sick coverage/sick case 33.02 (14.50) 39.33 (36.11)* 38.84 (23.52)*
Sick coverage/annual fee 1.19 (2.34) 0.98 (1.24)** 1.45 (2.12)
Sick coverage/annual tot. fee 0.87 (0.39) 0.79 (0.37)* 0.84 (0.32)
Medical exp./sick day 0.02 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09)** 0.03 (0.08)
Medical exp./sick case 0.52 (1.98) 0.42 (2.50) 0.69 (2.44)
Avg. administration cost 1.44 (1.16) 1.54 (1.20)** 1.93 (1.19)*
Avg. variable cost 8.49 (5.70) 8.89 (7.26) 9.70 (4.16)*
Avg. balance 2.41 (3.28) 3.15 (6.23)* 1.87 (3.67)**
Avg. assets 37.13 (55.55) 29.43 (27.04)* 40.74 (43.79)
Avg. debt 2.04 (37.94) 0.27 (1.20) 0.26 (1.01)
30Table 9: Sample means, survivors, entry societies & exit so-
cieties: Policy Statutes. Standard deviation in parenthesis.* indicates
signicant dierence at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, in means test,
in comparison to survivors.
survivors entry societies exit societies
Policy Statutes
Mean min.age 16.26 (1.47) 16.52 (1.29)* 16.56 (2.00)**
Mean max. age 48.14 (8.17) 49.45 (9.25)* 49.69 (9.66)**
Mean min. initial fee 2.44 (4.25) 2.85 (5.10)* 2.08 (3.81)
Mean max. initial fee 2.96 (4.50) 3.12 (5.25) 2.41 (4.02)**
Mean min premium 7.99 (3.94) 8.86 (4.52)* 6.48 (4.84)*
Mean max premium 8.29 (4.36) 9.28 (5.02)* 6.78 (4.95)*
Mean assessment (illness) 0.01 (0.06) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.03)
Mean assessment (funeral) 0.61 (0.63) 2.02 (5.71)* 0.80 (0.61)**
Mean guaranty fee 0.04 (0.47) 0.35 (2.53)* 0.33 (1.25)*
Mean waiting time (illness) 88.67 (62.46) 77.40 (52.01)* 95.13 (150.54)
Mean waiting time (funeral) 76.03 (85.77) 73.97 (121.07) 111.58 (322.02)*
Mean qualifying time 0.48 (3.97) 0.80 (5.19)** -
Mean min. sick days 5.46 (2.38) 4.90 (5.48)* 4.81 (3.02)*
Mean full coverage 65.21 (30.88) 56.69 (34.41)* 56.38 (42.65)*
Mean half coverage 5.17 (24.26) 5.34 (18.31) 5.90 (18.33)
Mean full coverage per case 30.12 (69.80) 34.67 (72.61) 24.89 (52.19)
Mean half coverage per case 50.30 (179.34) 61.09 (183.85) 51.26 (193.82)
Mean coverage per week 8.54 (3.04) 10.04 (6.17)* 7.84 (5.38)*
Mean funeral coverage 87.54 (130.40) 101.49 (176.45)* 73.06 (59.98)**
Mean funeral coverage, wife 4.50 (25.13) 3.88 (13.90) 1.67 (8.52)**
31Table 10: Logit estimation, balanced sub-panel. Dependent
variable: Pure Insurance Societies. Explanatory variables are mean levels
per society. Standard errors in parenthesis. f/p indicates if explanatory
variables originates from nancial accounts or policy statutes. * indicates
signicance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 10% level.50



























sick cov./member f  0:056
(0:107)
: : :





sick cov./sick case f  0:005
(0:016)
. . :


































































society age f . . . 0:006*
(0:003)
ratio of female members f . . . 0:142
(0:187)











Psuedo R2 - 0.3384 0.1242 0.1059 0.1108
no. of observations - 2925 2925 2925 2898
50Other control variables: sick coverage per annual fees in model 1, organisation and
region dummies in model 4, average administration cost and average variable cost in




No. of members, by gender
No. of sick cases, by gender




















No. of policy categories





For health coverage, per week and member
For funeral coverage, per death and member
Guarantee fee
Waiting time after entry for health coverage
Waiting time after entry for funeral coverage
Qualifying time after registration of illness for health coverage (karen-
stid)
Minimum sick days for health coverage
Maximum health coverage per year
Whereafter half coverage, days
Maximum health coverage per registered sick case
Whereafter half coverage, days
Health coverage per week (SEK)
Funeral coverage per member (SEK)
Funeral coverage for wife (SEK)
3313.2.1 Category variables and denitions
Region:
 Osterg otland: A 0 - 1 variable equal to one when the insurance society
is situated in  Osterg otland and zero for Stockholm.
Organization:
skills-based, employer-based, open, special interest, national other
Membership size:
members - total no. of female and male members
Registered illness levels:
average sick days - registered sick days/members
average sick cases - registered sick cases /members
Sick insurance coverage:
mean sick coverage per week,
sick coverage per member - (expenses:sick coverage paid)/members
sick coverage per sick day - (expenses:sick coverage paid)/registered sick
days,
sick coverage per registered sick case - (expenses:sick coverage paid)/registered
sick cases
Insurance costs to members:
maximum initial fee
maximum annual premium
average premium paid - (income:annual fees)/members
Insurance coverage per cost:
sick coverage per annual fees - (expenses:sick coverage paid)/(income:annual
fees)
sick coverage per total fees - (expenses:sick coverage paid)/(income:annual
fees + assessments)
Society costs:
average administration cost -(expenses:administration cost)/members
average variable cost - (total expenses-administration costs)/members
Financial status:
average assets - assets/members
average debt - debt/members
average balance - balance/members
Moral hazard controls:
waiting time-sick coverage
qualifying time
minimum sick days
34